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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN WAR.——*Negociations at Ghent.—Measures of the American Congress.—Battle near Fort Erie.—Lake Ontario.—Dispatches about the Lake Champlain Battle.—British attack on Fort Mobille.*——The negociations at Ghent, though kept a secret from Johnny Bull, have reached him, as most other disclosures do, through the tell-tale press of America. Oh! that Republic and her Press! How many things the world knows through them! Is there no way of reducing *them* to silence? Take it in hand, good people, and see if there be no means of accomplishing it.——These negociations shew, that JONATHAN, poor despised JONATHAN, is not much less smart in the cabinet than he is in the field. Certainly nothing ever was better managed than this negociation on the part of JONATHAN. He pricked our brains, and then would do nothing, until he heard what the people of America should say. The ground of Messrs. Bayard, Gallatin, &c. was very reasonable; for, how could they be expected to have instructions, relating to matters *never before matters of dispute?* The substance of the disclosure is this: we asked *as a preliminary*, that the Republicans should give up part of their territory, including those very Lakes, and their own borders of those Lakes, whereon they have defeated us, and which are their only secure barrier against us and our Indian allies.——The President, of course, lost no time in laying these papers before the Congress, who are said to have heard them with unanimous indignation; and the *Times* newspaper tells us, that "these "papers have been made the means of "*uniting against us the whole American* "*people.*"——Thou great ass, they were united against us before. There were only a handful of "*Serene Highnesses*" and "*Cossacks*" in Massachusetts, the acquaintance of Mr. Henry, who were not united against us.—This, I suppose, is the shift that you resort to in order to cover your disgrace, in having to announce that Mr. Maddison is "*yet*" President, and that he is not even "*impeached.*"—There is one passage in the last dispatch of Mr. Monroe, worthy of great attention. He tells the Plenipotentiaries, that "there is "much reason to presume, that Great "Britain has *now* OTHER OBJECTS "than those, for which she has *hitherto* "professed to contend."——Whether he built this presumption on the language of our *public prints*, or on the report of a *speech in Parliament*, attributed by those newspapers to Sir *Joseph Yorke*, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, in which report the reporters made Sir *Joseph* say, that we had Mr. Madison to DEPOSE before we could lay down our arms. This report was published some time in *May or June;* and in *August* Mr. Monroe's dispatch was written.——However, be the ground of presumption what it would, Mr. Madison does not seem to have changed his tone on account of it; and there can be no doubt that the people must have been greatly inflamed by such an impudent declaration.——This shews what mischiefs newspapers can do. The war is, in great part, the war of the *Times* and the *Courier*. Let them, therefore, weep over the fate of our fleets and armies in Canada and at Mobille.——*The measures of the American Congress* seem to be of a very bold character, and well calculated for a war of long continuation. The President has not been afraid to lay bare all the wants of the Government, and to appeal to the sense and patriotism of the people. From every thing that I can discover, the *Noblesse* of Massachusetts will not be able to prevent, or even impede, any of these measures.——JOHNNY BULL is, in last Sa-

turday's Gazette, treated to an account of the late battle near Fort Erie, from which JONATHAN sallied out upon Gen. Drummond's army. According to this account, our loss was as follows:—

KILLED	Captains	- -	1
	Lieutenants	-	2
	Serjeants	- -	7
	Rank and file	-	105
			115
WOUNDED	Lieut.-Colonels		3
	Captains	- -	3
	Lieutenants	-	10
	Ensigns	- -	1
	Serjeants	- -	13
	Drummers	-	1
	Rank and file	-	147
			178
MISSING	Majors	- -	2
	Captains	- -	4
	Lieutenants	-	3
	Ensigns	- -	2
	Adjutants	- -	1
	Surgeons	- -	1
	Serjeants	- -	21
	Drummers	-	2
	Rank and file	-	280
			316
			609

A most bloody battle! The armies, on both sides, are handfuls of men. These are battles of a very different description from those of the *Peninsula*, as it was called. General Drummond complains of the *overwhelming force* of the enemy. How came he to *besiege* him then? It was a *sally*, observe, on the part of the Americans; and, it is the first time I ever heard of a sallying party being stronger than the army besieging them.——In the teeth of facts like these the malignant ass of the *Times* newspaper has the impudence to say, with as much coolness as if he had never heard of these things: "A peace "between Great Britain and the United "States can properly be made no where "but in America. The conferences should "be carried on at New-York or Phila-"delphia, having previously fixed at those "places the head-quarters of a PICTON or "a HILL."—If Mr. Madison had this writer in his pay, the latter could not serve the Republican cause more effectually than he is now doing.——On Lake Ontario our newspapers now say, that we have "*decided superiority of force.* Very well. Let us have no more of that kind. Let us have no *retreat* [illegible] shall have taken place.——The official accounts relative to the affair at Plattsburg and Lake Champlain are the most curious, certainly, that ever were seen. They consist of a mere account of the number of killed, wounded, and missing, up to the time that our army quited, or was about to quit, Plattsburg, that is to say, [mind the *dates!*] up to the FOURTEENTH OF SEPTEMBER. Not a word have we about the RETREAT from Plattsburg, nor about the battle on Lake Champlain, though we have an account from Sir George Prevost dated on the FOURTH OF OCTOBER.—— Mark that well.——The dispatch is said to have been dated on the 11th, at Plattsburg, but it contains the account of the losses to the 14th!——Let us hear the apology of the *Times* newspaper:—"The "return from the 6th to *the* 14*th* of Sep-"tember being inclosed in the dispatch "bearing date *the* 11*th*, is *easily* ac-"counted for, from the circumstance of "that dispatch not having been made up "for some time after. Although dispatches "have arrived of *a later date* from Sir "George Prevost, *none* has been received "containing *any account of his retreat.* "Private letters, however, *contradict* the "American statements of precipitation and "embarrassment in Sir George's move-"ments on that occasion. The dispatch "of the 11th, before mentioned, *refers* to "the action on the Lake, but it is *not* "*thought proper* to publish this until an "official account of the action reaches *the* "*Admiralty.*"—Very well, now. Let us grant that it would not be *proper* to publish Sir George's account of the action on the Lake, though it was such a lumping concern as to require but little nautical skill to describe it; yet, here is no reason at all given for not publishing Sir George's account *of his own retreat*, other than its *not having been received*, which is most wonderful, seeing that it is the invariable practice to enclose *duplicates* and *triplicates* of every preceding dispatch, when forces are at such a distance. How came Sir George, in his dispatch of the 4th of October, not to send a *duplicate* of the account of his retreat, if he had sent that account before? And, if he had not sent it before, how came he not to send it along with his dispatch of the 4th of October?——The solving of these questions will be very good amusement for the winter evenings of Johnny Bull, who was so anxious "to give the Yankees a good

"*drubbing*," and who thinks nothing at all of the Property Tax when compared with so desirable an object.——Reader, pray let me bring you back to the affair of Plattsburg. It is situated on the side of Lake Champlain, about 25 miles within the United States. There is a fortress near it, in which Jonathan had 1,500 regulars and 5 or 6,000 militia.—Against this fort and force, Sir George Prevost, with 14 or 15,000 men, marched early in September, the fort being to be attacked by water by our fleet, at the same time that our army attacked it by land. The attack was made, but the American fleet came up, attacked ours, beat and captured the whole of the ships.——Sir George Prevost, seeing the fate of the fleet, retreated speedily into Canada, was followed, as the Americans say, by their army, who harrassed it, took some cannon, a great quantity of stores, and many prisoners, and received, from the British army, a great number of *deserters*, who quitted Sir Geo. Prevost, and went over to them. This is the most serious part of the subject; and, therefore, as the Montreal newspapers had stated that we lost 150 men by desertion; as the Americans made them amount to *a great many hundreds;* and, as Mr. Whitbread, in the debate in Parliament, a few days ago, said he had heard that they amounted to 2,000, and that, too, of *Wellingtonians*, the people were very anxious to see *Sir George Prevost's account of his retreat*. The Ministers said, that Sir George Prevost had said NOTHING about any DESERTION; and that, of course, *he would have mentioned it*, if it had been true. But the *Times* newspaper now tells us, that Sir George has sent *no account* of his *retreat;* or, at least, that *none has been received*. According to the Ministers, Sir George's account *has* been received, and no mention is made in it of desertions. According to the *Times*, Sir George's account *has not* been received. We must believe the Ministers, of course, and must set the *Times* down for a promulgator of wilful falsehoods. But, then, there is a *rub* left: if the account of the retreat is come, WHY NOT PUBLISH IT?—This is another riddle, Johnny Bull, for your winter evenings amusement.—— The attack of our forces on Mobille furnishes a new feature to the war.——We have before seen the two parties engaged, frigate to frigate, brig to brig, sloop to sloop, and, in two instances, fleet to fleet. We have seen them, on land, alternately besieged and besieging. We now see the Americans in a fort, containing only 138 men, attacked by a combined naval and military armament, as to the result of which, after describing the scene of action, we must, for the present, take their own official account. Point Mobille is situated on the main land on the border of the gulph of Mexico, not far from the mouth of the great river Mississippi. On this point is a fort, called Fort Bowyer, belonging to the Republican enemy, to the attack of which our squadron proceeded in September last. Here follows the official accounts:

"*Letter from Major-General Jackson to the Secretary at War, dated Head-quarters, 7th Military District, Mobille, Sept.* 17.

"SIR,—With lively emotions of satisfaction, I communicate that success has crowned the gallant efforts of our brave soldiers, in resisting and repulsing a combined British naval and land force, which, on the 15th instant, attacked Fort Bowyer, on Point of Mobille. I enclose a copy of the official report of Major W. Lawrence, of the 2d infantry, who commanded. In addition to the particulars communicated in his letter, I have learnt that the ship which was destroyed was the *Hermes*, *of from* 24 *to* 28 *guns*, Captain the Hon. W. H. Percy, senior officer in the Gulph of Mexico: and the brig that was so considerably damaged *is the Sophie*, 10 *guns*, Captain William Lockyer. The other ship was the *Carron*, *of* from 24 *to* 28 *guns*, Capt. Spencer, son of Earl Spencer; the other brig's name unknown. On board of the Carron 85 *men were killed and wounded;* among the latter was Col. Nicholl, of the Royal Marines, who lost an eye by a splinter. The land force consisted of 110 marines, and 200 Creek Indians, under the command of Capt. Woodbine, of marines, and about 40 artillerists, with one four and an half-inch howitzer, from which they discharged shells and nine-pound shot. They re-embarked the piece, and retreated by land towards Pensacola, whence they came. By the morning report of the 16th, there were in the fort, fit for duty, officers and men, 138."

"*Letter from Major Lawrence to Major-Gen. Jackson, dated Fort Bowyer, Sept.* 18, 12 *o'clock at night.*

"SIR—After writing the enclosed, I was prevented by the approach of the enemy from sending it by express. At

"meridian they were under full sail, with "an easy and favourable breeze, standing "directly for the Fort, and at 4 *p. m.* we "opened our battery, which they returned "from two ships and two brigs, as they "approached. The action became general "at about 20 minutes past 4, and was "continued without intermission on either "side until 7, when one ship and two brigs "were compelled to retire. The leading "ship, supposed to be the Commodore, "mounting twenty-two 22-pounders, having "anchored nearest our battery, was so "much disabled, her cable being cut by "our shot, that she drifted on shore, with-"in six hundred yards of the battery, and "the other vessels having got out of our "reach, we kept such a tremendous fire "upon her, that she was set on fire and "abandoned by the few of the crew who "survived. At ten *p. m. we had the plea-"sure of witnessing the explosion of her "magazine.* The loss of lives must have "been immense, as no boats left her ex-"cept three, which had previously gone "to her assistance, and one of these "I believe was sunk; one of her boats "was burned alongside of her. The "brig that followed her was much da-"maged in hull and rigging. The other "two did not approach *near enough* to be "so much injured, but I am confident did "not escape, as a well-directed fire was "kept on them the whole time. Ten "minutes past *p. m. the whole enemy's "fleet are standing to sea.*"——I extract these articles from the *Times* newspaper; and yet, in the face of these facts, in defiance of these red-hot balls, the consummate ass would make no peace, except at *New-York* or *Philadelphia*, they being first the head-quarters of a *Picton* or a *Hill!* This is as good a lift as this writer could have given to Mr. Madison, and as hard a blow as he could have given to the *Noblesse* of Massachussetts, on whom he and the rest of our war tribe had built, and do still build, their hopes of ultimate success.——Let him look at the attitude of New-York and of Philadelphia. I do not say, that it is impossible to get at either of those cities with bomb-shells or rockets; but I am quite satisfied, that it would require a *very large army* to set foot in either of them, even for the purpose of burning and then quitting them in safety.——I will now make an observation or two with regard to *public opinion* as to the American war. People are *disappointed.* The continuance of the *Property Tax* pinches. But would they have the luxury of war without paying for it? No, no. *Pay* they must; or they must put up with what they have gotten, and see the *Stars* and *Stripes* waving in every sea.—They would have *war.* War was their cry. They have it, and they must and will PAY for it.

LETTER I.

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL, ON THE AMERICAN WAR.

Botley, Nov. 24, 1814.

MY LORD,—From the report of your speech, on the 8th inst. it appears very clearly, that your Lordship is, by the reporter, made to entertain an opinion, that the DIVISIONS amongst the American people are already such, that we may rationally hope, by a continuation of the war, to produce either a compliance with *any conditions*, or an overthrow of the *Union*, in which Union alone consists the strength and the prospect of future greatness in that rising and fast-growing Republic. The words, as given in the report of your speech, were these:—"He (the Earl of "Liverpool) had seen much stronger justi-"fications of the conduct of our forces at "Washington, which had been published in "America, than any that had been published "even in this country. Not only were they "not more hostile to us, but the reverse was "the case. In places even where the Bri-"tish arms had been successful the people "had shewn themselves in our favour, and "had seemed well disposed to put themselves "under our protection."—Your Lordship is not singular in your opinion, if it be your opinion. It is the general opinion in this country. *How* that opinion has been created and kept alive, I will not now inquire. The *means* made use of for this purpose, the "most thinking people" know nothing of. They have opinions furnished them by others as regularly as soldiers or sailors are served with rations. The lower class are, from their poverty, wholly without the pale of information true or false, and appear to know and care as little about the acts of the Government, and the state of public affairs, as the earth, or any other substance, on which they expend their time and their physical force. The middle class are so incessantly employed in pursuit of the means of keeping themselves from the horrors of pauperism, that they

have no time for discussion or inquiry. Many persons, in this class of life, have asked me, whether the Americans *could speak English*. Few men in the higher ranks of life know any thing worth speaking of, with regard to the American Republic, a nation nearly equal in population to Great Britain, and inhabited, as we now feel, by men full as enterprising and as brave as our own soldiers and sailors. Even the writers, who have fanned the flame of this bloody war, appear to know nothing at all about the real state of America; for, though they have no desire to promulgate truth; though it is their *trade* to deceive and cheat the people, they shew by their statements, that they are ignorant of facts, which, if they knew them, would make them able to deceive with less exposure to detection. This being the case, it is no wonder that the whole nation is in a state of error as to this matter of primary importance. On the day when the news reached the country, relative to the capture of the City of Washington, I happened to call, on my way homewards from Sussex, at the house of a gentleman, who was likely to be as well informed as any other gentleman in the country, as to this or any other political matter. The following was the dialogue, wherein I shall exhibit the gentleman and his good wife under the name of Friend.

Mrs. Friend. Well, Mr. Cobbett, we shall soon get rid of the Income Tax [for so it is always called in the country] *now*.

Mr. Cobbett. Shall we, Madam? I am very glad to hear it. It will enable me to get a better horse for my gig.—[*She had just been laughing at my scurvy equipage.*] —But, why *now*, Madam? What has happened to excite such a cheering hope?

Mrs. Friend. Why, have you not heard the *news?*

Mr. Cobbett. No.

Mr. Friend. We have taken the *Capital* of America.

Mrs. Friend. And the cowardly dogs, to the amount of 9,000 men, ran away before 1,500 of our soldiers.

Mr. Friend. President and all ran away! Nobody knows where they went to, and the people were ready to submit to us all over the country.

Mrs. Friend. Cowardly dogs! Not stand to fight a moment for their Capital. They are a pretty nation to go to war with England!

Mr. Friend. They ran away like a great flock of South Down sheep before a pack of hounds.

Mrs. Friend. The cowardly creatures will never dare shew their faces again. What can you say for these Americans *now?*

Mr. Cobbett. Why, I say, that you appear to know no more about them than about the people said to be in the moon. Let me look at the paper. [*It lay before her on the table.*]

Mrs. Friend. No: we must tell it you. It is too long for you to sit and read to yourself.

Mr. Cobbett. Well; now, mind, I tell you, that, instead of putting *an end* to the war, this event will tend to prolong it; and, mind, I tell you, that, unless *we give up* what we contend for, the war will be of many years duration, and will be as expensive and more bloody than the war in Europe has been.

Mrs. Friend. WE *give up* to such cowards as the Americans!

Mr. Cobbett. I do not mean to give up either *territory* or *honour*. I mean give up the point in dispute; or, rather, our *present apparent object*. The Americans, like other people, cannot meet disciplined armies, until they have had time to organise and discipline themselves. But, the Americans are not *cowards*, Madam. Their seamen have proved that; and, what I fear is, that a continuation of the war will make the proof clearer and clearer every day, by land as well as by sea; and, I am *now* more than ever afraid of a long continuation of the war; because, if such people as *you* seriously think that we are able to conquer America, I can have no reason to hope that any part of the nation remains undeceived.

Mr. Friend. But, do you not think that the *States will divide?*

Mr. Cobbett. Certainly not.

Mr. Friend. No!

Mr. Cobbett. No. And, I should be glad to know what are your *reasons* for believing that they will divide. If you will give me any *reasons* for your belief, I will give you mine for a contrary belief. Do *you* think, Madam, that the people of America are weary of living for thirty years without an Income Tax?

Mr. Friend. I have no reasons of my own about the matter. We see, in all our *papers*, that the Americans are a very divided people. They say that they cannot long hold together.

Mr. Cobbett. And do you really believe what these corrupted vagabonds put into their columns? You believe, then, of course, that "the American navy would "be swept from the face of the ocean in a "month;" for so they told you. Yet, how different has been the event! No, no: the Americans are not *cowards*, Madam.

Mrs. Friend. Have you had such heaps of melons this year as you used to have.

Such was, as nearly as I can recollect, the dialogue upon this occasion; and, as I am sure, that the war is continued in the hope, on the part of the *nation*, at least, of deriving success from *a breaking up of the Union* in America, which I am thoroughly persuaded we shall not effect, or see take place, I will endeavour to shew, that this my persuasion rests on good grounds; and, if I succeed in this endeavour, I shall not yet abandon the hope, to which my heart clings, of seeing peace speedily restored between the two countries, upon terms not injurious to the interest or character of either.

In turning back, now, to the *reported* speech of your Lordship, I perceive, and I perceive it with great regret, that you are, by the reporter, made to found your opinion of Americans' disaffection to their Government, and of their attachment to our King, in part, upon the fact of their having treated our officers, prisoners of war, with great liberality and kindness. I noticed this in my last Number. I challenged any one to shew the instance, in which they had ever behaved cruelly to prisoners of war. I cited the memorable case of Mr. (now Sir Charles) *Asgyll*, and I appealed to their uniform conduct, during the present war, including the instances of Commodores *Bainbridge* and *Perry*. But as the conduct of the former, in this respect, has been most basely slandered in some of our public prints, I will be somewhat more particular as to both instances, adding that of Captain *Lawrence*.

Commodore Bainbridge captured the Java, off St. Salvadore, on the 29th of December, 1812. His frigate, the Constitution, carried 44 guns, and ours 49 guns, according to the American accounts. Ours, he says, had upwards of 400 men on board. The Republicans killed 60 and wounded 170 of our officers and men, and had themselves 9 killed and 25 wounded. After the battle, at their pressing request, Commodore Bainbridge *paroled them all*. The Java had on board Lieutenant General Hislop and his staff, together with several supernumerary officers and men. The following letter of General Hislop to Commodore Bainbridge will best speak for the latter:—"*Dear Sir*,—I am justly pe-"netrated with the fullest sense of your "very handsome and kind treatment, ever "since the fate of war placed me in your "power, and I beg once more to renew to "you my sincerest acknowledgments for "the same. Your acquiescence with my "request in granting me my parole, with "the officers of my staff, added to the ob-"ligation I had previously experienced, "claims from me this additional tribute of "my thanks. May I now finally flatter "myself, that in the further extension of "your generous and humane feelings, in "the alleviations of the misfortunes of war, "that you will have the goodness to fulfil "the only wish and request I am now most "anxious to see completed, by enlarging "on their parole (on the same conditions "you have acceded to with respect to my-"self) all the officers of the Java still on "board your ship—a favour I shall never "cease duly to appreciate by your acqui-"escence thereto.—I have the honour to "subscribe myself, dear Sir, your much "obliged and very obedient Servant."

The request was instantly complied with. Men and all were released upon parole.—In the case of Commodore Perry, the battle was fought on Lake Erie on the 10th of September, 1813. With vessels, carrying altogether 54 guns, he not only defeated, but *captured*, the whole of our fleet, six vessels, carrying 65 guns, as he stated in his official report; which report, by-the-bye, fully justifies our *Admiralty* as to Lake Erie. I take the following paragraph from his report to his Government upon this occasion:—"I also beg your in-"structions respecting the wounded. I am "satisfied, Sir, that *whatever steps I* "*might take governed by humanity would* "*meet your approbation.* Under this im-"pression, I have taken upon myself to "promise Captain Barclay, who is very "*dangerously* wounded, that he shall be "landed as near Lake Ontario as possible, "and I had no doubt you would allow me "to parole him. He is under the impres-"sion that nothing but leaving this part of "the country will save his life. There is "also a number of Canadians among the "prisoners, *many who have families.*"

Captain Lawrence, in the brig Hornet, attacked and sunk, in fifteen minutes, our

brig, the Peacock, killing between 30 and 40 of her men, while the Hornet lost but *one* man killed and *two* wounded. Thus says the American report. Ours I have not at hand. Then comes the following letter:——*New York, 27th March*, 1813. "SIR——We, the surviving officers of "his Britannic Majesty's late brig Peacock, beg leave to return you our grateful acknowledgments for the *kind attention and hospitality* we experienced "during the time we remained on board "the United States sloop Hornet. So "much was done to alleviate the distressing and uncomfortable situation in which "we were placed, when received on board "the sloop you command, that we cannot "better express our feelings than by saying, '*We ceased to consider ourselves "prisoners*;' and every thing that friendship could dictate was adopted by you, "and the officers of the Hornet, to remedy "the inconvenience we would otherwise "have experienced from the unavoidable *loss "of the whole of our property and clothes by "the sudden sinking of the Peacock*. Permit "us then, Sir, impressed as we are with a "grateful sense of your kindness, for ourselves and the other officers and ship's "company, to return you and the officers "of the Hornet our sincere thanks, which "we shall feel obliged if you will communicate to them in our name; and believe "us to remain, with a high sense of the "kind offices you have rendered us, your "humble servants,—F. A. Wright, 1st "Lieutenant; C. Lambert, 2d Lieutenant; "Edward Lott, Master; J. Whittaker, "Surgeon; F. Donnithrone Unwin, Purser; *James Lawrence*, Esq. *Commander "U. S. sloop Hornet*."——The American papers added, upon this occasion, the following:—"It is a fact worthy of note, and "in the highest degree honourable to our "brave tars, that on the day succeeding "the destruction of his Britannic Majesty's brig Peacock, the crew of the "Hornet made a subscription and supplied "the prisoners (who had lost almost every "thing) with two shirts, a blue jacket and "trowsers each."

Now, my Lord, without going into more particulars, let me ask you, whether you think that this conduct towards our officers was the effect of disaffection towards their own Government, of disapprobation of its conduct, of a hatred of the war, and of "a *disposition* to put themselves *under "our protection?*" And, if you answer in the negative, as you must, I suppose, why do you think, that the humane treatment of our officers elsewhere indicates such a disposition? Does your Lordship see no possible danger in drawing such an inference? Do you think, that it is wholly out of all belief, that your being reported to have drawn such an inference may render the treatment of our officers, prisoners of war, less humane and kind in future?—Seeing that a disposition in an American citizen to put himself under the protection of our King is a disposition to commit *treason*, in the eye of the laws of his country, would it be so very surprising, if, in future, the Americans should be very cautious how they exposed themselves to the merit of such a compliment? I must, however, do your Lordship the justice to observe here, that what the proprietors of our newspapers have published as *your speech*, might never have been uttered by you. I would fain hope, that they have, in this case, put forth, under your name, the suggestions of their own minds. I, therefore, comment on the thing as *theirs* and not as *yours*.

In order to shew, that there is no good foundation for the hope, entertained by people here, and so often expressed by our newspapers, *of dividing the Republic of America*, I must go into a history of the *parties*, which exist in that Republic; give an account of their origin and progress, and describe their present temper and relative force. The population is divided into two parties; the REPUBLICANS and the FEDERALISTS. The latter also claim the title of *Republicans*, but it is, and, I think, we shall find, with justice, denied to them by the former.

These two parties have, in fact, existed ever since the close of the Revolutionary war, though their animosities have never appeared to be so great, nor to threaten such serious consequences as since the commencement of the French Revolution, and especially since the first Presidency of Mr. Jefferson, whose exaltation to the Chair was the proof of decided triumph on the part of the Republicans, and plunged their opponents into a state of desperation.

The *Federalists* took their name from the General Government, which, being *federative*, was called *Federal*. Some of the people, as well as some of the Members of the *Convention*, who formed the Constitution, were for the new General Government, and some were against it. These

who were against it, and who were for a Government of a still more *democratical* form, were called, at first, *Anti-federalists;* but, of late, they have been called *Republicans*, in opposition to the Federalists, who were for a Government of an *aristocratical*, if not of nearly a kingly form, and who proposed, in the Convention, a President and Senate *for life*. There was at this time a great struggle between the parties; the opposition of the Republicans spoiled the projects of the Federalists; and the Government was, at last, of a form and nature, which was wholly pleasing to neither, but which did not, on the other hand, greatly displease either.

The Federalists, however, took the whole credit to themselves of having formed the Government; and, as General Washington, who had been President of the Convention, and was decidedly for a Federative General Government, was elected the President under the new Constitution, the Federalists, at once, assumed, that *they* were the only persons, who had any right or title to have any thing to do with that Government, treating their opponents as persons *necessarily hostile to*, and, of course, unfit to be entrusted with, the carrying on of the Federal Government.

When the first Congress met, under the new Constitution, it was clear, that the Federalists endeavoured to do, by degrees, that which they had not been able to accomplish all at once in the Convention. They proposed to address the President by the title of HIS SERENE HIGHNESS, and to introduce other forms and trappings of royalty, or, at least, of high aristocracy. Their intention was defeated, to their inexpressible mortification. The people were shocked at these attempts; and, from that moment, the opposite party seem to have gained ground in the confidence of the people, who abhorred the idea of any thing that bore a resemblance of Kingly Government, or that seemed to make the slightest approach towards *hereditary* or *family* rule.

When the French Revolution broke out; when that great nation declared itself a *Republic*, and went even further than America had gone in the road of democracy, the two parties took their different sides.—Heats and animosities were revived.—While General Washington remained President, however, he acted with so much caution and moderation that it was difficult for any one openly to censure him. He was blamed by both parties. One wished him to take part with France, the other with England. He did neither, and, upon the whole, he left no party any good reason to complain of him. But when Mr. Adams, who was a native of Massachusetts, where the Federal party was in great force, became President, he certainly did, yielding to the counsels of weak and violent men, push things very nearly to an offensive and defensive alliance with us. The violent and unjust proceedings of the French Government furnished a pretext for raising *an army*, which was, for some time, kept on foot *in time of peace*, in the very teeth of the Constitution. A *Sedition Bill* was passed, with power of *sending aliens out of the country;* and many other things were done, in the heat of the moment, which Mr. Adams, had he not been surrounded by the Massachusetts Federalists, never would have thought of, being a Republican at heart, and a real friend to the liberties of his country.

Mr. Adams's Presidency ended in March, 1801. He was proposed to be *re-elected;* but he lost his election, and the choice fell upon Mr. Jefferson, who had always been deemed the head of the Republican party. The truth is, that the *people* were Republicans *at heart*. Every thing had been tried; threats, alarms, religion, all sorts of schemes; but they took alarm at nothing but the attempts upon their liberty, and they hurled down the party who had made those attempts. Since that time, the Government has been in the hands of the Republicans. Mr. Jefferson was President for eight years, Mr. Madison for four years, and is now going on for the second four years.

Your Lordship knows, as well as any man upon earth, how fond people are of *place* and *power;* and that no part of any opposition is so bitter and troublesome as that part, which consists of men, whose ambitious hopes have been blasted by their being *turned out of place*. It now happened, very naturally, but rather oddly, that the *Federalists* became the *opposition* to the *Federal Government;* but they still retained, and do retain, their title; though, really, they ought to be called, the Aristocrats, or Royalists.

This opposition is now, however, chiefly confined to the *State of Massachusetts*, the State Government of which has even *talked* about *separating from the Union*. Your Lordship has heard of a Mr. Henry, who

was, it seems, in close consultation and correspondence with the persons holding the reins of Government in Massachusetts, *upon the subject of such separation*, and who pretended that he was employed by Sir James Craig, Governor of Canada, for that purpose. Your Lordship, I believe, *disclaimed* him and his intrigues, and, therefore, I must believe, of course, that he was *not* employed by our Government nor by our Governor. But the people of America have been led to believe, that there must have been *something in his story*.

This State of Massachusetts contains a great number of men of talents; many rich men, become so chiefly *by the purchasing, at a very low rate, of the certificates of soldiers who served in the late war, and by procuring acts of Congress to cause the sums to be paid in full*, which, indeed, was thought, and openly said, to be their main object in pressing for a Federal Government with large powers. These men, now disappointed in all their ambitious hopes; seeing no chance of becoming petty noblemen; seeing the offices and power of the country pass into other hands, without the smallest probability of their return to themselves, unless they be content to abandon all their high notions of family distinction; these men have become *desperate*; and, if am to judge from their proceedings, would plunge their country into a civil war, rather than yield quiet obedience to that very Government, which they had so long been in the practice of censuring others for not sufficiently admiring. But, my Lord, though there is a *majority of voices* in Massachusetts *on our side;* for on *our side* they really are, there is a thumping minority on the other side; and what is of great importance in the estimate, that minority consists of the nerves, the bones, and sinews of the population of the State; so that the sum total of our ground of reliance, as to a separation of the States, is the good will of the most numerous but most feeble and inefficient part of the people of the State of Massachusetts; and even these, I am fully persuaded, are, by this day, awed into silence by the determined attitude of the rest of the country.

The same charges, which our vile newspapers have been preferring against Mr. Madison, have been preferred against him by their *Serene Highnesses* of Massachusetts. They have accused him of a *devotion to France;* they have, in our newspaper style, called him the "*tool of Napoleon;*" they too, have dared to assert, that he made war upon us, *without the slightest provocation*, for the purpose of aiding Napoleon in destroying England, "*the bulwark of their religion.*" They have held public feasts and rejoicings at the entrance of the *Cossacks* into France, and at the restoration of the ancient order of things. You will bear in mind, that these people are staunch *Presbyterians;* and it would amuse your Lordship to read the orations, preachings, and prayers of these people; to witness their gratitude to heaven for restoring the *Pope*, whom they used to call the Scarlet Whore, the Whore of Babylon; for the re-establishment of the *Jesuits;* and for the re-opening of the dungeons, the re-sharpening of the hooks, and the re-kindling of the flames of the *Inquisition.* Their opponents, the Republicans, say, we never were the friends of Napoleon, as a despot, nor even as an Emperor; we never approved of any of his acts of oppression, either in France or out of France; we always complained of his acts of injustice towards ourselves; but he was less hurtful to our country than other Powers; and, as to mankind in general, though we regretted to see him with so much power, we feared that that power would be succeeded by something worse; and we cannot now rejoice, that the Pope is restored, that the Jesuits are re-established, the Inquisition re-invigorated; that Monkery is again overspreading the fair face of Europe; and that the very hope of freedom *there*, seems to be about to be extinguished for ever. And this, your Lordship may be assured, is the languageof nineteen twentieths of the people of America.

There are, it is to be observed, *Federalists* in *all* the States, which you will easily believe, when you consider how natural it is for men, or, at least, how prone men are, to wish to erect themselves into *superior classes.* As soon as a man has got a great deal of money, he aims at something beyond that. He thirsts for distinctions and titles. His next object is to hand them down to his family. It will require great watchfulness and great resolution in the Americans to defeat this propensity. You have not leisure for it, or it would amuse you to trace the workings of this would-be nobility in America. They are very shamefaced about it; but they let it peep out through the crannies of their

hypocrisy. Being defeated, and totally put to the route in the open field by the general good sense of the people, they have resorted to the most contemptible devices for effecting, by degrees, that which they were unable to carry at a push. They have established what they call "*Benevolent Societies*," to which they have prefixed, by way of epithet, or *characteristic*, the name of *Washington*. The *professed* object of these societies, who have their periodical orations, preachings, prayings, and toastings, was to afford relief to any persons who might be in *distress*. The *real* object appears to have been to enlist idlers and needy persons under their political banners. These little coteries of hypocrites appear to have assembled, as it were, by an unanimous sentiment, or, rather, by instinct, to celebrate the fall of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Pope, the Jesuits, and the Inquisition. But unfortunately for this affiliation of hypocrites, they have little or no *materials* to work upon in America, where a man can earn a week's subsistence in less time than he can go to apply for and obtain it without work; and, accordingly, the affiliation seems destined to share the fate of the *Serene Highness's* proposition of 25 years ago.

The fall of Napoleon, so far from weakening, will tend to strengthen the general Government in the hands of the Republicans. It has deprived its enemies of the grand topic of censure; the main ground of attack. The "*Cossacks*," as they are now sometimes called, of Massachusetts, can *no longer* charge the President with being the "*tool of Napoleon*;" they no longer stand in need of England as "the *bulwark of religion*," seeing that they have the Pope, the Jesuits, the Benedictines, the Franciscans, the Carthusians, the Dominicans, and, above all, the Inquisition, to supply her place in the performance of that godly office.—— They will no longer, they *can* no longer, reproach the President for his attachment to *France;* for France has now a *king*, a *legitimate* sovereign, who regularly hears mass. They are now, therefore, put in this dilemma: they must declare openly for England against their country; or, by petty cavilling, must make their opposition contemptible. The former they *dare* not do; and, they are too restless and too full of spite not to do the latter. So that their doom, I imagine, is sealed; and their fall will not be much less complete than that of Napoleon himself, with this great difference, however, that his name and the fame of his deeds will descend to the latest posterity, while their projects of enobling themselves at the expence of their country's freedom and happiness, will be forgotten and forgiven before one half of them are eaten by worms.

This is my view of the matter. Your Lordship will probably think it erroneous; but, if it prove correct, how long and how bitterly shall we have to deplore the existence of this bloody contest. I am, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Desperate Naval Engagements.

I observe it stated in the Halifax papers of the 2d instant, that the *Prince of Neufchatel*, an American armed brig, had arrived at Boston, after sustaining a gallant action of twenty minutes, with five boats full of men belonging to our ship of war the *Endymion*. The account says, that one of our boats was sunk during the engagement, "which had on board at first "43 men, of whom two only were saved; "and another, which had 36 men, was "taken possession of after having eight "killed, and 20 wounded." The *Endymion* is said to have had lost in all 100 men killed, wounded and prisoners, among which the first Lieutenant and a Master's Mate were killed, and three Lieutenants and two Master's Mates wounded. The *Prince of Neufchatel* had only "31 men "at quarters, including officers, and 37 "prisoners on board. Six of her men were "killed, 15 severely wounded, nine slightly, and eight remained unhurt." It is true, that nothing has been published here in an *official* shape respecting this naval disaster; but this circumstance can no more invalidate the truth of the statement, than the *silence* which has been kept up as to the fate of the *Avon*, will lead us to doubt that that vessel was sunk by her American opponent. The repulse and disaster attending the *Endymion*, is not, however, the only naval triumph of the enemy, which has been carefully concealed from the public eye. The following article appears in the Paris Papers, received to the 22d inst.:—— "*Extract of a Letter from* "*Mr. John B. Dabney, Consul for the* "*United States of America, Fayal, Oct. 6.* "Our countrymen have had a brilliant "affair. Despising the rights of nations and "violating neutral territory, three English "vessels, the *Plantagenet*, the *Rota*, and

"the *Carnation*, attacked the brig *General* "*Armstrong*, American privateer, of 14 "guns, commanded by Captain Reed, at "anchor in these Roads. They succeeded "finally in destroying her, but paid dearly "for it, for they had 120 killed, and 90 of "their best marines wounded, including "the flower of their officers. Captain "Reed, with his brave crew, consisting "only of 90 men, had only seven men "slightly wounded."——About ten days ago I received the following letter from an English gentleman at Fayal, which he transmitted by a vessel bound for Lisbon, giving the full particulars of the above affair. It speaks volumes, and must reach conviction to the minds of those who are so far deluded, as to think that it is in the power of this country to subdue a people who fight with so much undaunted resolution as the Americans:—

Fayal, Oct. 15, 1814.

WM. COBBETT, ESQ.——*Sir*,—The American schooner privateer *General Armstrong*, of New York, Captain Samuel C. Reid, of seven guns, and ninety men, entered here on the 26th ult. about noon, 17 days from that place, for the purpose of obtaining water. The Captain, seeing nothing on the horizon, was induced to anchor. Before the elapse of many hours, his Majesty's brig *Carnation* came in, and anchored near her. About six, his Majesty's ship *Plantagenet*, of 74 guns, and the *Rota* frigate, came in and anchored also. The Captain of the privateer and his friends consulted the first authorities here about her security. They all considered her perfectly secure, and that his Majesty's officers were too well acquainted with the respect due to a neutral port to molest her. But, to the great surprise of every one, about nine in the evening, four boats were dispatched, armed and manned from his Majesty's ship, for the purpose of calling her out. It being about the full of moon, the night perfectly clear and calm, we could see every movement made. The boats approached with rapidity towards her, when, it appears, the Captain of the privateer hailed them, and told them to keep off several times. They, notwithstanding, pushed on, and were in the act of boarding before any defence was made for the privateer. A warm contest ensued on both sides. The boats were finally dispersed with great loss. The American, now calculating on a very superior force being sent, cut his cables, and rowed the privateer close in alongside of the fort, within half cable's length, where he moored her, head and stern, with four lines. The Governor now sent a remonstrance to the Van Lloyd of the *Plantagenet* against such proceedings, and trusted that the privateer would not be further molested; she being in the dominions of Portugal, and under the guns of the castle, was entitled to Portuguese protection. Van Lloyd's answer was, that he was determined to destroy the vessel at the expence of all Fayal, and should any protection be given her by the fort, he would not leave a house standing in the village. All the inhabitants were gathered about the walls, expecting a renewal of the attack. At midnight, 14 launches were discovered to be coming in rotation for the purpose. When they got within clear, or gun shot, a tremendous and effectual discharge was made from the privateer, which threw the boats into confusion. They now returned a spirited fire, but the privateer kept up so continual a discharge, it was almost impossible for the boats to make any progress. They finally succeeded, after immense loss, to get alongside of her, and attempted to board at every quarter, cheered by the officers with a shout of no quarter, which we could distinctly hear, as well as their shrieks and cries. The termination was near about a total massacre. Three of the boats were sunk, and but one poor solitary officer escaped death in a boat that contained fifty souls; he was wounded. The Americans fought with great firmness, but more like blood thirsty savages than any thing else. They rushed into the boats, sword in hand, and put every soul to death as far as came within their power. Some of the boats were left without a single man to row them; others with three and four. The most that any one returned with was about ten. Several boats floated on shore full of dead bodies. With great reluctance I state that they were manned with picked men, and commanded by the first, second, third, and fourth Lieutenants of the *Plantagenet*; first, second, third, and fourth ditto of the frigate, and the first officers of the brig; together with a great number of midshipmen. Our whole force exceeded 400 men. But three officers escaped, two of which are wounded.—This bloody and unfortunate contest lasted about forty minutes. After the boats gave out, nothing more was attempted till day-light the next morning, when the *Car-*

nation hauled in alongside, and engaged her. The privateer still continued to make a most gallant defence. These veterans reminded me of Lawrence's dying words, off the Chesapeake, "don't give up the ship."——The *Carnation* lost one of her top-masts, and her yards were shot away; she was much cut up in rigging, and received several shot in her hull. This obliged her to haul off to repair, and to cease firing.—The Americans now finding their principal gun (*long Tom*) and several others dismounted, deemed it folly to think of saving her against so superior a force; they therefore cut away her masts to the deck, blew a hole through her bottom, took out their small arms, cloathing, &c. and went on shore. I discovered only two shot holes in the hull of the privateer, although much cut up in rigging.—Two boats' crews were soon after dispatched from our vessels, which went on board, took out some provisions, and set her on fire. For three days after, we were employed in burying the dead that washed on shore in the surf. The number of British killed exceeds 120, and ninety wounded. The enemy, to the surprise of mankind, lost only two killed and seven wounded.—We may well say, "God deliver us from our ene-"mies, if this is the way the Americans "fight."—After burning the privateer, Van Lloyd made a demand of the Governor to deliver up the Americans as his prisoners, which the Governor refused. He threatened to send 500 men on shore and take them by force. The Americans immediately retired, with their arms, to an old Gothic convent; knocked away the adjoining drawbridge, and determined to defend themselves to the last. The Van, however, thought better than to send his men. He then demanded two men, which, he said, deserted from his vessel when in America. The Governor sent for the men, but found none of the description given.—Many houses received much injury on shore from the guns of the *Carnation*. A woman, sitting in the fourth story of her house, had her thigh shot off, and a boy had his arm broken. The American Consul here, has made a demand on the Portuguese Government for a hundred thousand dollars for the privateer, which our Consul, Mr. Parkin, thinks in justice will be paid, and that they will claim on England.——Mr. Parkin, Mr. Edward Bayley, and other English gentlemen, disapprove of the outrage and depredation committed by our vessels on this occasion. The vessel that was dispatched to England with the wounded, was not permitted to take a single letter from any person.—Being an eye-witness to this transaction, I have given you a correct statement as it occurred.——With respect, I am, &c.

H. K. F.

AMERICAN PAPERS.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 11.

The following Message was yesterday sent to both Houses of Congress by the President of the United States. The sentiments it excited in both Houses are purely national, and almost unanimous:—

"*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.*

"I lay before Congress communications just received from the Plenipotentiaries of the United States, charged with negociating peace with Great Britain, shewing the conditions on which alone that Government is willing to put an end to the war. The instructions to those Plenipotentiaries, disclosing the grounds on which they were authorised to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace, will be the subject of another communication.

(Signed) "JAMES MADISON."

Mr. Monroe to the American Plenipotentiaries at Gottenburgh.

"Dispatch of State, 28th Jan. 1814.

[The letter begins by acceding to the proposal of the British Government to treat directly with the American United States. Mr. Monroe then calls the attention of the Plenipotentiaries to the grounds of the war with Great Britain.]

"On Impressment, as to the right of the United States to be exempted from it, I have nothing new to add. The sentiments of the President have undergone no change on that important subject. This degrading practice must cease; our flag must protect the crew, or the United States cannot consider themselves an independent nation. To settle this difference amicably the President is willing, as you are already informed by the former instructions, to remove all pretexts for it to the British Government, by excluding all British seamen from our vessels, and even to extend the exclusion to all British subjects, if necessary, excepting only the few already naturalized, and to stipulate, likewise, the surrender of all British seamen deserting in our ports in future from British vessels, public or private. It was presumed by all dispassionate persons, that the late law of Congress relative to seamen would effectually accomplish the object. But the President is willing, as you find, to prevent a possibility of failure, to go further. Should a treaty be made, it is proper, and would have a conciliatory effect, that

all our impressed seamen, who may be discharged under it, should be paid for their services by the British Government, for the time of their detention, the wages which they might have obtained in the merchant service of their own country.

"Blockade is the subject next in point of importance, which you will have to arrange. In the instructions, bearing date on the 15th of April, 1813, it was remarked, that as the British Government had revoked its Orders in Council, and agreed that no blockade could be legal which was not supported by an adequate force, and that such adequate force should be applied to any blockade which it might hereafter institute, this cause of controversy seemed to be removed. Further reflection, however, has added great force to the expediency and importance of a precise definition of the public law on this subject. There is much cause to presume, that if the repeal of the Orders in Council had taken place in time to have been known here before the declaration of war, and had had the effect of preventing the declaration, not only that no provision would have been obtained against impressment, but that under the name of blockade the same extent of coast would have been covered by proclamation, as had been covered by the Orders in Council.—The war which these abuses and impressments contributed so much to produce, might possibly prevent that consequence. But it would be more satisfactory, if not more safe, to guard against it by a formal definition in the treaty. It is true, should the British Government violate again the legitimate principles of blockade, in whatever terms, or under whatever pretext it might be done, the United States would have in their hands a correspondent resort; but a principal object in making peace, is to prevent, by the justice and reciprocity of the conditions, a recurrence again to war, for the same cause. If the British Government sincerely wishes to make a durable peace with the United States, it can have no reasonable objection to a just definition of blockade, especially as the two Governments have agreed in their correspondence, in all its essential features. The instructions of the 15th April, 1813, have stated in what manner the President is willing to arrange this difference.

"On the other, neutral rights, enumerated in the former instructions, I shall remark only, that the catalogue is limited in a manner to evince a spirit of accommodation; that the arrangement proposed in each instance is just in itself; that it corresponds with the general spirit of treaties between commercial powers; and that Great Britain has sanctioned it in many treaties, and gone beyond it in some.

"On the claim to indemnity for spoliations, I have only to refer you to what was said in the former instructions. I have to add, that should a treaty be formed, it is just in itself, and would have a happy effect on the future relations of the two countries, if indemnity should be stipulated on each side, for the destruction of all unfortified towns, and other property, contrary to the laws and usages of war. It is equally proper that the negroes taken from the southern States should be returned to their owners, or paid for at their full value. It is known that a shameful traffic has been carried on in the West Indies by the sale of these persons there, by those who professed to be their deliverers. Of this fact, the proof that has reached this department shall be furnished you. If these slaves are considered as non-combatants, they ought to be restored; if, as property, they ought to be paid for. The treaty of peace contains an article which recognizes this principle.

[After some further arguments relative to the Russian mediation, which the President laments was not accepted, the letter concludes.] "JAMES MONROE."

Messrs Adams, Bayard, Clay, and Russell, to Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1814.

"Sir—We have the honour to inform you, that the British Commissioners, Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq. and William Adams, Esq. arrived in this city on Saturday evening, the 8th instant.—The day after their arrival, Mr. Baker, their Secretary, called upon us to give us notice of the fact, and to propose a meeting at a certain hour, on the ensuing day. The place having been agreed upon, we accordingly met, at one o'clock, on Monday, the 8th instant. We enclose herewith a copy of the full powers exhibited by the British Commissioners at that conference; which was opened, on their part, by an expression of the sincere and earnest desire of their Government, that the negociation might result in a solid peace, honourable to both parties. They, at the same time, declared, that no events which had occurred since the first proposal for this negociation, had altered the pacific dispositions of their Government, or varied its views as to the terms upon which it was willing to conclude the peace. We answered, that we heard these declarations with great satisfaction, and that our Government had acceded to the proposal of negociation, with the most sincere desire to put an end to the differences which divided the two countries, and to lay, upon just and liberal grounds, the foundation of a peace which, securing the rights and interests of both nations, should unite them by lasting bonds of amity. The British Commissioners then stated the following subjects, as those upon which it appeared to them that the discussions would be likely to turn, and on which, they were instructed:

"1. The forcible seizure of mariners on board of merchant vessels, and in connection with it, the claim of his Britannic Majesty to the allegiance of all the native subjects of Great Britain.

"We understood them to intimate, that the British Government did not propose this

point as one which they were particularly desirous of discussing; but that as it had occupied so prominent a place in the disputes between the two countries, it necessarily attracted notice, and was considered as a subject which would come under discussion.

"2. The Indian Allies of Great Britain to be included in the pacification, and a definite boundary to be settled for their territory.

"The British Commissioners stated, that an arrangement upon this point was a *sine qua non*; that they were not authorised to conclude a treaty of peace which did not embrace the Indians as Allies of his Britannic Majesty; and that the establishment of a definite boundary of the Indian territory was necessary to secure a permanent peace, not only with the Indians, but also between the United States and Great Britain.

"3. A revision of the boundary line between the United States and the adjacent British Colonies.

"With respect to this point, they expressly disclaimed any intention on the part of their Government to acquire an increase of territory, and represented the proposed revision as intended merely for the purpose of preventing uncertainty and dispute.

"After having stated these three points, as subjects of discussion, the British Commissioners added, that before they desired any answer from us, they felt it incumbent upon them to declare, that the British Government did not deny the right of the Americans to the fisheries generally, or in the open seas; but that the privileges, formerly granted by treaty to the United States, of fishing within the limits of the British jurisdiction, and of landing and drying fish on the shores of the British territories, would not be renewed without an equivalent. The extent of what was considered by them as waters peculiarly British, was not stated. From the manner in which they brought this subject into view, they seemed to wish us to understand that they were not anxious that it should be discussed, and that they only intended to give us notice that these privileges had ceased to exist, and would not be again granted without an equivalent, nor unless we thought proper to provide expressly in the treaty of peace for their renewal.

"The British Commissioners having stated, that these were all the subjects which they intended to bring forward or to suggest, requested to be informed, whether we were instructed to enter into negociation on these several points? and whether there was any amongst these which we thought it unnecessary to bring into the negociation? and they desired us to state, on our part, such other subjects as we might intend to propose for discussion in the course of the negociation. The meeting was then adjourned to the next day, in order to afford us the opportunity of consultation amongst ourselves, before we gave an answer. In the course of the evening of the same day, we received your letters of the 25th and 27th of June.

"There could be no hesitation, on our part, in informing the British Commissioners, that we were not instructed on the subjects of Indian pacification or boundary, and of fisheries; nor did it seem probable, although neither of these points had been stated with sufficient precision in that first verbal conference, that they could be admitted in any shape. We did not wish, however, to prejudge the result, or by any hasty proceeding abruptly to break off the negociation. It was not impossible that, on the subject of the Indians, the British Government had received erroneous impressions from the traders in Canada, which our representations might remove; and it appeared, at all events, important to ascertain distinctly the precise intentions of Great Britain on both points. We therefore thought it advisable to invite the British Commissioners to a general conversation on all the points: stating to them, at the same time, our want of instructions on two of them, and holding out no expectation of the probability of our agreeing to any article respecting them. At our meeting on the ensuing day we informed the British Commissioners, that upon the first and third points proposed by them we were provided with instructions, and we presented as further subjects considered by our Government as suitable for discussion.

"1st. A definition of blockade; and as far as might be mutually agreed, of other neutral and belligerent rights.

"2d. Claims of indemnity in certain cases of capture and seizure.

"We then stated that the two subjects, 1st of Indian pacification, and boundary; and, 2d, of fisheries, were not embraced by our instructions.—We observed, that as these points had not been heretofore the grounds of any controversy between the Government of Great Britain and that of the United States, and had not been alluded to by Lord Castlereagh, in his letter proposing the negociation, it could not be expected that they should have been anticipated, and made the subject of instructions by our Government: that it was natural to be supposed that our instructions were confined to those subjects upon which differences between the two countries were known to exist; and that the proposition to define, in a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, the boundary of the Indian possessions within our territories was new and without example. No such provisions had been inserted in the Treaty of Peace in 1783, nor in any other treaty between the two countries—no such provision had, to our knowledge, ever been inserted in any treaty made by Great Britain or any other European power in relation to the same description of people, existing under like circumstances. We would say, however, that it would not be doubted, that peace with the Indians would certainly follow a peace with Great Britain—that we had information that Commissioners had already been appointed to treat with them; that a treaty to that effect might, perhaps, have been already concluded—and that the United States having no interest, nor any motive, to continue a

separate war against the Indians, there could never be a moment when our Government would not make peace with them.

"We then expressed our wish to receive from the British Commissioners a statement of the views and objects of Great Britain upon all the points, and our willingness to discuss them all, in order that, even if no arrangement should be agreed on, upon the points not included in our instructions, the Government of the United States might be possessed of the entire and precise intentions of that of Great Britain respecting these points, and that the British Government might be fully informed of the objections on the part of the United States to any such arrangement. In answer to our remark, that these points had not been alluded to by Lord Castlereagh, in his letter proposing the negociation, it was said that it could not be expected that in a letter, merely intended to invite a negociation, he should enumerate the topics of discussion, or state the pretensions of his Government, since these would depend upon ulterior events, and might arise out of a subsequent state of things. In reply to our observation, that the proposed stipulation of an Indian boundary was without example in the practice of European nations, it was asserted, that the Indians must in some sort be considered as an independent people, since treaties were made with them, both by Great Britain and by the United States, upon which we pointed out the obvious and important difference between the treaties we might make with the Indians, living in our territory, and such a treaty as was proposed to be made, respecting them, with a foreign power, who had solemnly acknowledged the territory on which they resided to be part of the United States.

"We were then asked by the British Commissioners whether, in case they should enter farther upon the discussion of the several points which had been stated, we could expect that it would terminate by some provisional arrangement on the points on which we had no instructions, particularly on that respecting the Indians, which arrangement would be subject to the ratification of our Government? We answered, that before the subjects were distinctly understood, and the objects in view more precisely disclosed, we could not decide whether it would be possible to form any satisfactory article on the subject; nor pledge ourselves as to the exercise of a discretion under our powers, even with respect to a provisional agreement. We added, that as we should deeply deplore a rupture of the negociation on any point, it was our anxious desire to employ all possible means to avert an event so serious in its consequences; and that we had not been without hopes that a discussion might correct the effect of any erroneous information which the British Government might have received on the subject, which they had proposed as a preliminary basis. We took this opportunity to remark, that no nation observed a policy more liberal and humane towards the Indians than that pursued by the United States; that our object had been, by all practicable means, to introduce civilization amongst them; that their possessions were secured to them by well-defined boundaries; that their persons, lands, and other property, were now more effectually protected against violence or frauds from any quarter, than they had been under any former Government; that even our citizens were not allowed to purchase their lands; that when they gave up their title to any portion of their country to the United States, it was by voluntary treaty with our Government, who gave them a satisfactory equivalent; and that through this means the United States had succeeded in preserving, since the Treaty of Greenville, of 1795, an uninterrupted peace of 16 years with all the Indian tribes—a period of tranquillity much longer than they were known to have enjoyed heretofore.

"It was then expressly stated on our part, that the propositions respecting the Indians was not distinctly understood. We asked, whether the pacification, and the settlement of a boundary for them were both made a *sine qua non?* Which was answered in the affirmative. The question was then asked the British Commissioners, whether the proposed Indian boundary was intended to preclude the United States from the right of purchasing by treaty from the Indians, without the consent of Great Britain, lands lying beyond that boundary? And as a restriction upon the Indians from selling, by amicable treaties, lands to the United States, as had been hitherto practised?—To this question, it was first answered by one of the Commissioners, that the Indians would not be restricted from selling their lands, but that the United States would be restricted from purchasing them; and on reflection, another of the Commissioners stated, that it was intended that the Indian territories should be a barrier between the British dominions and those of the United States; that both Great Britain and the United States should be restricted from purchasing their lands; but that the Indians might sell them to a third party.—The proposition respecting Indian boundary, thus explained and connected with the right of sovereignty ascribed to the Indians over the country, amounted to nothing less than a demand of the absolute cession of the rights both of sovereignty and of soil. We cannot abstain from remarking to you, that the subject (of Indian boundary) was indistinctly stated, when first proposed, and that the explanations were at first obscure, and always given with reluctance.—And it was declared from the first moment to be a *sine qua non*, rendering any discussion unprofitable, until it was admitted as a basis. Knowing that we had no power to cede to the Indians any part of our territory, we thought it unnecessary to ask, what probably would not have been answered till the principle was admitted, where

the line of demarkation of the Indian country was proposed to be established.—The British Commissioners after having repeated that their instructions on the subject of the Indians were peremptory, stated, that unless we could give some assurance, that our powers would allow us to make at least a provisional arrangement on the subject, any further discussion would be fruitless, and that they must consult their own Government on this state of things. They proposed accordingly a suspension of the conferences, until they should have received an answer, it being understood that each party might call a meeting whenever they had any proposition to submit. They dispatched a special messenger the same evening, and we are now waiting for the result.

"Before the proposed adjournment took place, it was agreed that there should be a protocol of the conferences; that a statement should for that purpose be drawn up by each party, and that we should meet the next day to compare the statements.—We accordingly met again on Wednesday the 10th instant, and ultimately agreed upon what should constitute the protocol of the conferences. A copy of this instrument we have the honour to transmit with this dispatch; and we also enclose a copy of the statement originally drawn up on our part, for the purpose of making known to you the passages to which the British Commissioners objected.—Their objection to some of the passages was, that they appeared to be argumentative, and that the object of the protocol was to contain a mere statement of facts. They, however, objected to the insertion of the answer which they had given to our question respecting the effect of the proposed Indian boundary; but they agreed to an alteration of their original proposition on that subject, which renders it much more explicit than as stated, either in the first conference, or in the proposed draught of the protocol.—They also objected to the insertion of the fact, that they had proposed to adjourn the conferences until they could obtain further instructions from their Government. The return of their messenger may, perhaps, disclose the motive of their reluctance in that respect. We have the honour to be, very respectfully, Sir, your humble and obedient servants,

(Signed) JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, J. A. BAYARD, H. CLAY, JONA RUSSELL."

In a letter from Messrs. Adam, Bayard, Clay, Russel, and Galatin, dated from Ghent, on the 19th August, 1814, the British Commissioners, in a conference on that day, explain the views of the British Government as follows:—

"1st. Experience had proved that the joint possession of the Lakes, and a right common to both nations, to keep up a naval force on them, necessarily produced collisions, and rendered peace insecure. As Great Britain could not be supposed to expect to make conquests in that quarter, and as that province was essentially weaker than the United States, and exposed to invasion, it was necessary, for its security, that Great Britain should require that the United States should hereafter keep no armed naval force on the Western Lakes, from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior, both inclusive; that they should not erect any fortified or military post or establishment on the shores of those Lakes; and that they should not maintain those which were already existing. This must, they said, be considered as a moderate demand, since Great Britain, if she had not disclaimed the intention of any increase of territory, might, with propriety, have asked a cession of the adjacent American shores. The commercial navigation and intercourse would be left on the same footing as heretofore. It was expressly stated (in answer to a question we asked), that Great Britain was to retain the right of having an armed naval force on those Lakes, and of holding military posts and establishments on their shores.

"2. The boundary line west of Lake Superior, and thence to the Mississippi, to be revised; and the Treaty right of Great Britain to the navigation of the Mississippi to be continued. When asked, whether they did not mean the line from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, the British Commissioners repeated that they meant the line from Lake Superior to that river.

"3. A direct communication from Halifax and the province of New Brunswick to Quebec, to be secured to Great Britain. In answer to our question, in what manner this was to be effected, we are told, that it must be done by a cession to Great Britain of that portion of the district of Maine (in the state of Massachusetts) which intervenes between New Brunswick and Quebec, and prevents that direct communication.

"We asked whether the statement made, respecting the proposed revision of the boundary line between the United States and the dominions of Great Britain, embraced all the objects she meant to bring forward for discussion, and what were particularly her views with respect to Moose Island, and such other Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, as had been in our possession till the present war, but had been lately captured? We were answered, that those Islands, belonging of right to Great Britain (as much so, one of the Commissioners said, as Northamptonshire,) they would certainly be kept by her, and were not even supposed to be an object of discussion.

"We need hardly say that the demands of Great Britain will receive from us an unanimous and decided negative. We do not deem it necessary to detain the John Adams for the purpose of transmitting to you the official notes which may pass on the subject and close the negociation. And we have felt it our duty immediately to apprise you, by this hasty but correct sketch of our last conference, there is not, at present, any hope of peace. (*Signed as above.*)

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